Ministerial Statement on Defence
Australia, House of Representatives
Debates, vol. HR66,
10 March 1970, pp. 232-47
Reprinted by permission
Mr MALCOLM FRASER (Wannon — Minister for Defence) — by leave — I propose in the course of my remarks to provide a broad view of our defence policy and the considerations that have contributed to it. I shall refer to the Government's defence objectives and to our planning arrangements which support them; to the capacity of our armed forces and to our proposals to increase that capacity.
I will set the Services' capability against the roles we have assigned them. I shall also mention the organisational changes which are still continuing in the defence structure which, I believe, are important in helping the Government to come to decisions in defence matters. Some of what I say will not be new but I feel it would be useful if the House could have as full a view as possible of our approach to defence policy.
Defence policies and the decisions we take to give effect to them must have meaning not only for the immediate present; they must also fit the situation that we assess will face us in the future. This task is not easy. There is a dynamic in the policies, the economic and the social changes of the countries of our region. The rapidity of technological and scientific development introduces yet another dimension. Yet if we are to take the right decisions, we must have a defence organisation which is equipped to analyse all the facts, and perceive as best it may what lies ahead.
My colleague, the Minister for External Affairs (Mr McMahon), will, in the course of this session, be giving the House a survey of the international situation and of Australia*s external policies. I shall confine myself to describing in brief terms the strategic setting against which the Government has made certain decisions and in the context of which we are elaborating our defence policies.
Strategic Setting
The world wars of this century had their roots in political conflict in Europe: 1945 heralded the end of European dominance. In the time since then the two themes of overriding importance in world affairs have been the pre-eminence of the continental superpowers in North America and Eurasia and the dramatic end of European colonial rule over much of the rest of the world. In1945, apart from New Zealand, there were three sovereign states within 5,000 miles of Australia. Today there are seven times that number in the same distance.
In retrospect we can discern the distinctive characteristics of the last 25 years. We need now to recognise that we are entering a new era. Since 1945, we have had a longer period of what is imprecisely called peace than prevailed between the two world wars. A generation which neither created nor experienced the last Great War has matured in, or in spite of, its aftermath. In what are still called the ‘newly independent’ countries, the first fully postcolonial generation already has emerged. Many nations, whose policies and roles are important to us and interact with our own, are now in a process of transition and reappraisal.
In Indonesia — our nearest neighbour and not so long ago a cause of concern to us — remarkable changes have been worked in favour of moderation and national rehabilitation. A large part of the world — certainly our part of the world — cannot but be interested in the way the new generation of Indonesian leaders further shape their country's future.
In mainland China, the so called cultural revolution was intended to mobilise the new generation in support of Mao Tse-tung's extreme radical and nationalistic policies. The Cultural Revolution was conceived in ideology: Its purpose was to perpetuate the revolutionary spirit of early Communism. Its immediate results are difficult to ascertain, let alone assess. But you cannot turn inside out a society so large, and on average so young, as the Chinese, without there being many consequences within, if not beyond, the borders of China. The Chinese have been taught to see themselves the sole repository of the true Communist doctrine and practice. China is developing a nuclear capability. She continues to give encouragement and support to Revolutionary movements in neighbouring countries. She has border disputes with India. She maintains pressure on Burma. She is engaged in building roads in northern Laos that could facilitate activities directed against Thailand. How much her border arguments and ideological disputes with Russia will affect the future history of Asia it is impossible yet to predict.
Japan is now the world's third industrial power. Japan's defence forces are of no mean dimension and there is currently a programme to expand them. It is unlikely that the Japan of the coming decades — an economic giant confident in its technological sophistication and advanced standards of living — will have the same outlook as the Japan of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed there is already wide agreement, including among the Japanese themselves, that some kind of break with the postwar era is developing. Japan in the 1970s and 1980s will have great opportunities to play a progressive and constructive part. in Asia. She has a substantial interest in the stability of the area because much of her trade, upon which her industrial growth and high living standards depend, originates in the South East Asian region or is funnelled through the narrow seas.
For 25 years the United States of America has carried the main burden of defence of the free world. Today it is a matter of public record that a re-appraisal is taking place of the manner in which American commitments might be discharged in the future. That re-appraisal focuses largely on Asia. The Nixon doctrine, first enunciated at Guam, is full of meaning for the countries to our north and to us. American help will be more readily forthcoming to those countries that help themselves; insurgency situations are expected to be contained — better still, prevented from developing — without United States combat manpower. It is to be expected that there will be some contraction of total United States forces and installations. However, the Americans have proclaimed that they will stand by their treaty obligations. Two of these are of major concern to us — ANZUS and SEATO.
Turning to the Soviet Union, her Far East fleet is growing and honourable members will be aware of the increasing Russian interest in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in the South East Asian region. Likewise she has sought to expand the scope of her diplomatic and trade relations with South East Asian and other nations touching the Indian Ocean. She has placed great emphasis on the development of a worldwide maritime capability, both merchant and naval, which are closely co-ordinated. We have recently had demonstrations of this capability, close to our shores. We have noted her ability to maintain groups of vessels at sea for unusually long periods. This extension of Soviet maritime interest, particularly in the Indian Ocean, is not something we can afford to be disinterested in. I have already said Australia cannot confront the Soviet Union, but we must take account of her Indian Ocean activities in our defence policies and planning.
I refer now to Great Britain. The United Kingdom has been searching for a new kind of role. Economic problems and what she regards as the necessity of her future, are leading her to Europe and the Common Market. Her present intention is not to maintain forces in her areas of traditional responsibility in Singapore and Malaysia. Nevertheless, her economic and commercial interests in this region are widespread. She intends to demonstrate her capacity to transport forces to Malaysia and Singapore quickly and she has undertaken to train and exercise in the area after 1971. Her present plans to have no forces permanently based in Malaysia-Singapore, and particularly no naval forces, add to the significance that we must attach to the increasing Russian activities in the Indian Ocean.
India, on the northern shores of the Indian Ocean, maintains one of the world's largest armies and some significant air and naval power backed by a growing economy. India strives to create a productive system which will provide one-seventh of the human race with better living standards. In the next 10 years the Indian population will almost certainly exceed 700 million. Australian interests cannot fail to be affected by India's success or failure in solving its problems with its neighbours and in building on the foundations of a great independent democracy.
What total situation will emerge from all of this we cannot foresee. Clearly, forces working around the world are going to affect South East Asia and Australia. While we must not fear change, and indeed social change is necessary in many countries, it would be foolish to act as if we had assumed that the overall thrust of future events will automatically enhance our security. We must note that of the seven major countries mentioned, Indonesia is our closest neighbour. Changing policies of the others are certain to have a cumulative impact on the region of our strategic interest.
In addition, our region of particular concern has its own problems of divisions between and within states. There is, of course, promise in countries which are marching boldly towards a better future for their citizens. At the same time, ethnic religious and political tensions and the pressure of rising populations, not matched by economic and social development, must cause concern.
Another point has to be made. The very nature of war has changed. We now have to contend with a variety of politico-military situations. These include subversion, confrontation, guerilla wars, 'revolutionary warfare’ and other limited conventional operations short of a 'declared’ war. Propaganda is an important weapon in these situations.
Our Basic Approach to Defence Policy
Against the strategic background I have sketched, 2 basic approaches were available to us. We, on the periphery of the region, might have sought to avoid its uncertainties and imponderables. Some might have taken the view that our growing wealth, our high productivity, our advanced technology and our geographical advantages, equipped us to take care of ourselves except against nuclear attack or a large-scale invasion, and that no additional effort was required. This is a strange, odd, concept. It smacks of Australia being in the region but not of it; of Australia passively waiting to be overtaken by events. It would be an attempt to have all the advantages at no risk. This surely is not the way to a viable meaningful community of friendly nations devoted to economic growth and development in an environment of stability and security.
The Australian Government has consistently engaged itself in political policies and in trade, financial and developmental aid activities which are designed to make an effective Australian contribution to the economic growth and political stability of the region to which we belong. It would be irrational for us to pursue these policy objectives while at the same time refusing to contribute to military security and to creating an environment of confidence which is indispensable for countries embarking on long range developmental plans.
If a policy of isolating ourselves ever made any sense, which I deny, the Nixon doctrine to which I have alluded makes it a complete nonsense. Considered from the narrowest military ground a policy with isolation as its central concept would pose one inescapable question: How long could we stand aloof in armed — or unarmed — detachment from our environment? One can only guess — probably a decade — perhaps a generation. There might be comfort in that for us — less for our next generation perhaps. For you do not make South East Asia or the Indian Ocean disappear by turning your back on them. The region of South East Asia and the surrounding Pacific and Indian Ocean waters comprise our environment: We are as well a part of the environment of the other nations in our region. If that environment is going to change we want to be able to play a meaningful part in the changes — not work out a relationship after the region had been transformed by processes with which we were not associated and of which we had accumulated little knowledge or experience
Of course we and other countries hope that by diplomacy and policies of aid we will reduce and ultimately eliminate threats to the region so that we may all devote our energies to improving the standard of life of our people. Military isolation on Australia's part would obstruct this objective. Military co-operation is designed to establish security so that the governments concerned can work for their own people without hindrance.
We reject the concept of detachment. We accept the risks and opportunities of involvement, within the limits of the Prime Minister’s statement of 25th February last year, because we believe isolation would lead to greater risks both for the region and for Australia. We do not believe there is any security in isolation. We believe there will be no permanent security for any of the small countries of the region until there is permanent security for all. This being the case, within our resources our military capability must be geared for deployment in the region of which Australia is a part when in our judgment we conclude that this is demanded by our concept of regional security as well as for the obvious purpose of meeting possible threats to Australian territory. This is the only proper conclusion, to which an analysis of our basic situation should lead us.
It should be noted also any other course would involve the denial of our treaty obligations. It would mean the elimination our South East Asia Treaty Organisation associations. It would be incompatible with ANZUS which some tend to suggest wrongly is a treaty of one way obligation. ANZUS does not mean merely that other people should prepare themselves to defend Australia’s interests. A policy based in isolation would have meant a different response from the one we gave the Malaysian and Singaporean requests that Australia continue to maintain forces in their countries. For the future it would mean standing aside from other forms of regional co-operation in defence. If anyone imagines that we could effectively maintain a broad ranging co-operation with the region but without forces capable of fulfilling a regional role then I can only say that such a policy would earn no response from our friends in the area. Politically it would lack credibility. In purely military terms, it would be impracticable. To be fully effective a regional policy at present requires deployment of forces in the area.
The decision the Government has taken concerning involvement in South East Asia and the maintenance of a force from our three Services in Singapore/Malaysia might appear superficially to represent little change from previous policy. But I hope I have said enough about the changing strategic setting to demonstrate that, if our decision is one for continuing involvement, it is also one for involvement in a new set of circumstances. So far as the region of South East Asia is concerned, the withdrawal of Britain as a power with major forces permanently stationed in the region is irreversible: The United States is reappraising the nature of its involvement: Soviet political and strategic policies impinge progressively upon the region: A changing Japan must feel its interests in security and stability affected by developments in the region: While China continues in a position of self-imposed isolation and of intransigence towards all noncompliant regimes in its vicinity.
It is against this background of change that we are moving from a situation in which we have been supporting commitments of major powers, to a position of partnership with other regional countries which must now accept greater responsibility for their own defence. The familiar forces which have influenced international events for the past 20 years are changing in directions which we cannot yet fully foresee. We are developing defence policies designed to serve us into the 1980s in a situation where we are faced with formidable uncertainties about the world in which we will be living. It follows that Australia will be required to show initiative and flexibility in the execution of her defence policies. At the same time our commitments must be related at all times to our capabilities and it must be clearly understood that there are limits on both.
Malaysia/Singapore
I want to refer in more detail to our relationship with Malaysia and Singapore. Since the early 1950s Australia has had a tradition of co-operation with, and of assistance to, these countries. We provided military help at the time of Communist emergency; we provided help during confrontation; and now when the British have announced a decision no longer to station forces in the region, we have said that, providing the two governments continue to desire our presence, we will maintain forces in the Malaysia/Singapore area after 1971.
This commitment should be judged against the spirit of co-operation and assistance that has prevailed over a great number of years. Governments nowadays do not sign blank cheques saying automatically that if something happens their troops will march. Our friends in Malaysia and Singapore will judge us by the pattern of past relationships. The past could give them no cause for doubt or hesitation as to where Australia would stand. They understand fully that decisions about the actual commitment of our troops at any particular time, and in any particular situation, must be just as much the prerogative of the Australian Government, as would be decisions by them affecting their forces.
The arrangements we are developing with these two countries both in the context of the Five Power arrangements, and separately, are well known. There have been Five Power meetings in Kuala Lumpur and Canberra at ministerial level and at Kuala Lumpur at senior official level. As well, the many details involved, including those connected with the proposed new air defence system, are being worked out in four advisory groups dealing with naval, army, air and joint service matters.
In a variety of ways we have done much to strengthen the defence capability of Malaysia and Singapore; the Sabres for Malaysia is a well known example. Discussions continue with the Malaysians about the co-location of Royal Malaysian Air Force units with ours at Butterworth and with the Singaporeans about the final location of our forces there now that their move from Terandak has been completed.
Vietnam
The Governor-General's Speech reiterated the Australian and allied purpose in Vietnam to oppose aggression and to seek to establish the circumstances in which the citizens of South Vietnam can live under a government of their choice. The Governor-General's Speech went on:
My Government is glad to note that the increasing capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves has already permitted the withdrawal of some Allied Forces. Should the future situation permit a farther substantial withdrawal of troops — beyond those announced by President Nixon on 16th December 1969 — then in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States, some Australian troops will be included, at some stage, in the numbers scheduled for such withdrawal.
My Department, the Department of the Army and others have been examining the situation closely so we will be in a position to discuss the matter with the Governments of South Vietnam, the United States and New Zealand.
Guiding Principles for the Development of Defence Capability
Our strategic situation coupled with our basic approach to regional defence leads to certain broad principles in developing our defence capability. They are:
(a) we seek the maximum of strategic flexibility;
(b) we see Australian security as intimately tied in with regional security;
(c) we wish our forces to be organised, equipped and trained so that they can be effectively employed in the region of which Australia is a part as well as for the direct defence of Australia;
(d) we see our forces as not being too closely tailored to particular requirements but versatile and flexible and capable of rapid deployment over a wide range of situations;
(e) we see our forces as being capable of a rapid response, with an offensive capability that would be an effective deterrent because it would enable us to reach out to an enemy;
(f) we see a need for our forces to be more self contained with a high degree of strategic and tactical mobility;
(g) we believe our forces must have reasonable compatibility of weapons and equipment with those of the United States and New Zealand;
(h) we see our forces requiring a sound infrastructure in Australia and its Territories, adequate to support the operations of our forces wherever they may be.
The Defence Organisation
The development of defence capability is a much more complicated procedure than was once the case; we need the professional military advice of our most senior officers; we need the best possible political and military intelligence; we need the best possible scientific and technical input; we need procedures for assessing our requirements for complicated equipments; we need to be able to question and probe effectively to make sure that the best possible solution to a particular military need is achieved. We need planning and preparations for the development of our forces based on joint concepts and plans to meet the various situations that may confront us. We need to ensure that each of. the Services prepares for the same kind of conflicts, in the same places and in the same time scale.
We must not be bound by tradition. If a matter has been pursued in a certain way that in itself is no argument for continuing.the old way. On the other hand, before tried and proven methods are abandoned, we must be sure that new ways and techniques will be better. Above all, change for its own sake is to be avoided.
The factors that we need to have in mind are twofold. Firstly, there are the likely circumstances for which we need to raise, train and equip forces. We have to project a view about this as far ahead as is sensibly possible. Secondly, there are the technological developments that are likely to bear on our choice of weapons systems.
I propose now to deal with the organisational changes we have made to aid our decision making.
Joint Staff
I want first to refer to the new Joint Staff arrangements established in the Department of Defence by my predecessor. The Joint Staff replaces most of the numerous committees which previously existed to which people were allocated by the individual Services. The Service members of the committees had a dual responsibility to the committee and to their Service chief.
Now senior officers from each of the Services are seconded to the Defence Department generally for a 3-year period to work on the Joint Staff along with selected officers of the Departments of Defence and External Affairs with responsibility only for the Joint Staff function. By this means members see problems as defence, not individual Service, problems. At the same time each gains an insight into, and invaluable experience of, the totality of defence planning, which should later stand him in good stead in his own Service.
The Joint Staff represents integration within the Defence Department of the best Army, Navy and Air Force expertise. The Department also provides for the coordinated examination of military, political, scientific and economic factors. The Joint Staff provides more effective support for the Joint Planning Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Its work is essential to consideration by the Defence Committee, the Minister for Defence and, where appropriate, the Cabinet.
Intelligence Arrangements
Australia must have intelligence arrangements of the highest order to ensure the availability of the best political, strategic and tactical information relevant to our interests.
The House is aware of the recent changes in our intelligence arrangements. We have amalgamated within the Defence Department, in a Joint Intelligence Organisation, the former Joint Intelligence Bureau with sections of the three Services Directorates of Intelligence. We have provided for the full participation of the Department of External Affairs. The purpose is to provide a unified environment for the quick and complete pooling of information and the consideration of the diverse factors that have to be weighed at the national or strategic level of assessment. Matters that must be considered include strategic, political, military, economic and scientific factors. Within this framework the former Joint Intelligence Committee has been replaced by a National Intelligence Committee at a higher level. It will include representatives from the Department of External Affairs as well as from the Joint Intelligence Organisation. It will be responsible for broad assessments and projections relevant to the planning of national security policy. I add that each of the Services remains responsible for meeting its own operational intelligence requirements.
Defence Science Arrangements
To provide the necessary scientific input, organisational changes have been made in my Department and the whole defence group. In the first place, there is now in the Defence Department an appropriate and active Defence Science Branch headed by a chief defence scientist. Through the Defence Research and Development Policy Committee, all scientific research in the Department of Defence and the three Services and the Department of Supply is coordinated. The number of scientific advisers seconded to the Services and the scope of their responsibilities have been increased.
Considerable support continues to be provided by the Research and Development Establishments in the Department of Supply. These laboratories maintain a high level of scientific competence over a wide range of disciplines, and are able to provide direct scientific assistance in solving many problems which arise from time to time in defence activity. The resources and facilities at Weapons Research Establishment formally allocated to the development and support of the joint project operations at Woomera have progressively been reoriented to meet the needs of Australian defence. A new Central Studies Unit has been established in Supply to engage in operational research studies on behalf of the defence group of departments and the armed Services. Its role will complement the operational analysis activities being undertaken within Defence and Service departments and within other establishments of the Department of Supply. A number of project development tasks are in progress designed to provide solutions to specific local defence needs, and if successful some of these could lead to production of various items of defence equipment.
Policy and Analysis
The policy and analysis sections of the Department have been greatly strengthened. A Policy Planning Branch has been established to ensure that proper attention is given to the more fundamental and long range issues in the strategic field that impinge in our security. In addition, proposals for equipment and major works coming from the Services are submitted to the Department of Defence for examination. The critical task is to make sure that regardless of individual Service interest, the best 'defence' solutions are found and the best allocation is made or those resources which are available to defence.
To assist in this decision making, we have established another group within the Department whose task it is to examine proposals and possible alternatives, taking account of the benefits and costs of each. Provided that our military requirements will satisfactorily be met, a proposal that will contribute to our industrial or technological skills in Australia, or put broader, to our economic and national development, is more attractive than one that will not. Costs cover more than the price tag on prime equipment. So we require the identification and costing of all ancillaries — for example the cost of support facilities manpower, training and maintenance. The Services will adopt the same techniques. The procurement of defence equipment is so important that it is my firm belief that all techniques must be used and exploited to ensure that our military needs are most effectively and economically met.
Special Studies Branch
A Special Studies Branch has been established in the Defence Department to examine aspects of the functions, organisation and activities of the defence group of departments so that we may achieve the most effective use of existing resources. Rationalisation or integration will not be pursued for their own sake; traditions have a value that should not be hastily discounted. But, if rationalisation or integration or co-location, or single-service management, or the standardisation of equipment, methods and procedures can achieve savings in manpower or in money without affecting efficiency, then those changes must be pursued. Within this context a number of studies are being undertaken. I shall refer to these later.
Defence and Industry
We recognise industry as the ’fourth arm of defence'. With this in mind, we have promulgated guiding principles for the procurement of defence equipment. They aim to ensure that the scope for Australian production is considered in the early stages of a Service requirement. It is in the interests of our allies as well as our own that the Australian industrial base is sound, diversified and technologically competent. Much credit is due to my predecessor for being the first to enunciate the policy of offset arrangements. It remains to see that those arrangements work. A mission concerned with these matters recently visited the United States, led by Sir lan McLennan who is also Chairman of the Defence (Industrial) Committee.
This Committee was established and the Business Board restructured to give my Department the best possible advice on the; capability of Australian industry and the best means of harnessing Australian production to the defence effort. The businessmen members of this Committee and the Board have already, in their examination of some matters of major importance, contributed much. We look to their playing a vital role in the general development of Australia's defence capacity and in aiding us to get the greatest value for every defence dollar. In this context I should also note the general logistic arrangements that my predecessor concluded with New Zealand.
Planning for the Future
Within the new defence organisation we are looking at a number of long term problems. In these studies special emphasis has been given to joint service-civilian participation to make the best use of available knowledge, military experience and analytical ability. Where possible, our efforts are directed to ensure that defence and national development march together. This applies not only to our relationships with industry to which I have referred, but also to the infrastructure required for military purposes — for example, airfields and dockyards. Wherever we can, we aim to develop facilities which will equally serve civil and national development objectives. I refer now to a number of inquiries in process.
Army Establishment
In recent years modern barrack accommodation has been built for 6 battalions. After Vietnam, additional accommodation will be required. There is a joint Defence-Army examination of this matter.
Naval Dockyards
We have under study the whole gamut of our requirements for naval dockyard facilities. Considering the withdrawal of the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean, it is no longer wise to concentrate all naval support facilities in the eastern States. A major question concerns the facilities that we should provide in Cockburn Sound that might earlier have been considered for Sydney or Melbourne.
Inter-relationship between Naval and Air Power
There is the highly complex problem of the inter-relationship of naval and airpower embracing the character and place, of naval platform and land based aircraft. It is to be remembered that 'Melbourne' has a life expectancy only until about 1980. So we have under study the whole complex of problems that relate to the place of carriers in our force structure.
Armed Forces of Papua and New Guinea
We have under study the kinds of forces that ought to be developed in Papua and New Guinea to meet the needs of an emerging independent community. Whatever may lie in the future, we have responsibility to ensure, as far as we may, that the forces in Papua and New Guinea will enable their future governments to meet their longer term defence needs.
Manpower
We are making a full examination of the total Service manpower problems including national service. In our full employment society, whatever other countries in their circumstances believe possible about fully volunteer forces, I see no likelihood that we will be able to sustain the forces required without national service in Australia. The purpose of this survey is not only to assess manpower requirements but also to ensure that we make the most effective use of available manpower, not only for the regular forces, but also for the reserve and citizen forces which are a vital element in our total defence capability.
Medical Services
The examination of the scope for rationalisation of overall medical services of our armed forces including the military hospital facilities required and the use that might be made of the hospital and rehabilitation facilities provided by the Repatriation Commission is well advanced.
Procurement
The organisations, functions and practices of the three Service departments and the Department of Supply in relation to procurement matters generally, both in Australia and overseas, are under study. The questions concern the degree to which the Department of Supply can be made responsible for defence procurement — an area where much has already been achieved — and the scope for extension of the single manager concept in respect of control of stores.
Flying Training
An overall review of flying training for the three Services is in progress In particular, consideration is being given to the possibility of establishing a joint Service helicopter training centre.
Service Communications
The scope for rationalisation of Service communications is under review. These assume great importance because we have, in many ways, entered a new era in communications and if we are to march in harmony with the many exciting technological developments In this field in a coherent and economical way, a unified defence approach will be essential.
Standardisation of Inventories
As a result of early studies, conversion of the inventories of defence equipment — some 1,300,000 items of supply — to a defence cataloguing system common to the three Services, and the Department of Supply and also to systems in the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries has made much progress. Considerable savings will result from reduced stock holdings, and by continual screening of apparently new items.
Organisation of the Army
To conclude my remarks in this section, I might refer to the study which the Army, in agreement with my Department, is about to undertake of the present command structure and of the functions of the various branches at headquarters level. Our present structure, as is well known, is largely based on State boundaries; it is rooted in the past; it goes back to the circumstances of the first decade of this century. The examination will determine, for example, whether the geographic Army command structure should be maintained or whether other arrangements should be made. My Department will be associated with the Army's study to watch particularly for implications on our total defence organisation. The report could be of far reaching consequence, and I pay tribute to the Army's initiative in this area.
Personnel
Time will not permit me to say as much as I should like about the importance of personnel policies. Our, economic and social circumstances are such that there is fierce competition for manpower. Defence is of the highest importance. Our Services require officers and men of the highest calibre. To obtain them, and retain them, we must have personnel policies in tune with our rapidly changing social attitudes and economic standards, in tune with the character of a democratic society in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Tri-Service Academy
I now have the report of the Committee headed by Sir Leslie Martin which was appointed by my predecessor to develop a plan for the establishment of one armed forces academy which would provide education at the tertiary level for officer cadets of all three Services. This report is being processed by my Department and the Service departments and I am preparing a submission for Cabinet.
Australian Services Staff College
In January this year, the first course commenced at the Joint Service Wing of the Australian Services Staff College. The Wing is located in temporary premises in Canberra pending the eventual co-location in Canberra of the single Service wings of the College which, for the present, are located in separate Service establishments. The objective of the Joint Service Wing is, broadly speaking, to train selected officers from the Armed Services for joint Service staff and command appointments. Senior officers of the Public Service concerned with defence also attend the course. The 6 months' course places emphasis upon joint Service planning and operations and the wider aspects of Australia's defence and foreign policies.
Pay and Conditions of Service
It is clear that matters relating to pay and other conditions of service cannot be divorced from the total stream of Services personnel administration, for example, such items as recruitment policies, duration of engagement, housing and so on. As I announced a few months ago, we have established a Pay and Conditions of Service Branch in my Department. A new high level Committee, the Defence (Conditions of Service) Committee, has assumed the functions previously discharged by the Treasury Finance Committee. This means that pay and conditions of service will, for the future, be considered by a Committee having equal status with the other top level committees of the higher defence machinery and within a defence environment.
I want to mention two matters in particular which have an impact on servicemen. The first concerns housing. That much progress has been made in providing housing for our servicemen is quickly apparent. In1964 we had some 11,000 houses for the Services. By the end of June next, we should have about 20,000 houses available. In addition, approximately another 1,000 will be under construction, or programmed for early commencement. In the meantime, of course, our forces have grown, but housing has more than kept pace with that expansion.
I believe that no aspect of service life gives rise to more dissatisfaction than the lack of certainty about the availability of housing at a new posting. So we intend to improve the housing position. We will continue vigorously with the major housing programme and we will be looking to see whether there are other practicable methods of cutting down delays, where they do occur, in a married serviceman becoming eligible for a married quarter after posting. Associated with housing is the frequency of postings. Too frequent moves are particularly unsettling for families and for school aged children. While the Services are giving much attention to reducing the frequency of postings, I shall be looking for even better results. A solution is not necessarily as easy as it seems. Particularly am I thinking of the Army, so long as its obligations in Vietnam continue, which call for one-year tours of duty.
These two matters are of great importance. I am sure that they bear directly on the high turnover of personnel the army and navy have been experiencing. That turnover, of course, requires an all too great diversion of personnel to training functions.
Programming
My predecessor told the Parliament last year that the Government had decided to move from fixed 3-year defence programmes to what he described as a 5-year rolling programme. I think the latter concept is not yet clearly understood, especially because the word 'programme' tends to indicate some immediately ascertainable series of items that are going to be purchased over any given period of 5 years.
The fixed period programmes of the past tended to lead to an uneven development of defence policy. Put broadly, unless some new factor emerged, proposals not included in one period programme were postponed to the next. We have now chosen a 5-year span for planning purposes. This we see as a realistic period permitting us a reasonable assessment of international political trends while not being too short to allow for the long lead times involved in acquiring modern defence equipment. Here I should make the point that much time may elapse between the initial formulation off a Service requirement and the actual decision to acquire the equipment sought.
Under the new concept the practice will be to review each year the future requirements of the Services over a forward period of 5 years against:
Firstly, the current assessment of our strategic situation which itself attempts to look forward over a 10 year period;
Secondly, consideration of the outlook for the capabilities and characteristics of the forces over the next 5 year period;
Thirdly, against the progress being made with studies in the Services and my Department of the most effective means of providing such capabilities as are needed; and
Fourthly, against the technological developments in sight.
Normally under these arrangements, defence equipment proposals will come forward at Budget time. So there will be announced, each year, additional proposals whether for needed expansion or replacement purposes. There will not be one momentous announcement once every 5 years but an announcement every year, in the setting I have described. I might illustrate this. At the beginning of any 5 year period there may be a certain piece of equipment that is believed necessary for a particular Service. Research and development may not be sufficiently far advanced for firm decisions to be made, but in 18 months or 2 years we may be in a position to make such decisions. Under our new programming concept there will be no inhibitions about this.
Thus, unlike the 3-year programme, the 5-year forward look will provide a continuing ability to respond to the progressive emergence of new equipment and techniques and the progressive development of defence planning and policy. This new concept will not remove problems of selection. Indeed we will always have to be careful that we do not, at any given stage, make decisions about new projects, important though they may be, that because of their cost might shut out higher priority items which will not be ready for decision for 1, 2 or 3 years.
The Roles and Capability of our Defence Forces
I have spoken about the changes in my Department to which I give full credit to my predecessor and the previous Secretary. I have indicated that these changes will be continuing; we are not in a strategic position. But organisation is nothing if it does not produce the desired results; that is, strong viable defence forces directed to meet the needs of Australia. I want to indicate in more precise terms the roles that we expect our defence forces to be able to fill, either in joint Service operations or on a single Service basis. I want to indicate in the broadest terms the present capacities of our forces and then I will tell the House how the decisions we have now made will add to that capacity.
Force Roles
Earlier I mentioned the guiding principles for the development of Defence capability. We are committed to regional defence. We are committed to the maintenance, under present circumstances, of forces overseas. We are committed to the protection of the Australian mainland and Territories. In conjunction with our friends and allies we must contribute to the security of our trade routes and our lines of communication. These commitments require that we pay particular regard to the development of certain areas of our overall defence capability. While these point to certain roles for all three Services, they are better viewed in a functional setting because the roles of the individual Services are seldom exclusive; generally any function involves more than one Service.
To start with, we need a greater maritime capability in the waters around Australia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the seas to our north. This involves both the Navy and the Air Force. We need greater strategic and tactical mobility, the capability to move forces quickly with adequate logistic support, the capability to bring to bear maximum fire power. We need to be able to maintain forces that we deploy abroad. We need the capacity for emergency air lift of troops and reinforcements and for subsequent support by sea. We have made much progress in this area and the announcements that I will shortly make will add to it. It does not mean that this capability should be exclusively Service provided. It includes making provision for harnessing commercial transport, maritime and air, if ever the need arises. Next there is scope for increasing our offensive capability.
l now come to the new decisions that the Government has made. The figures quoted represent for the most part the estimated capital cost of the projects.
| $m | |
| Light Destroyer (Patrol) Detailed Design | 5.0 |
| Eighty-four Observation Helicopters (Light Helicopters) | 23.0 |
| Forty-two Utility Helicopters | 31.6 |
| Eleven VTOL Aircraft for Fire Support (Helicopter Gunships) | 13.2 |
| Naval Communications Station, Darwin — New Receiving Facilities | 3.8 |
| Overhaul and Modernisation of gun mounts for the Guided Missile Destroyers | 8.1 |
| Two Oberon class Submarines | 37.2 |
| Six Low Cover Radars | 6.0 |
| One Logistic Cargo Ship for the Army | 10.0 |
| Ten Additional Skvhawks for the Navy | 20.0 |
| Two Twin-engined Support and Training aircraft | 8.0 |
The estimated total capital project costs of these various items is $165.9m. I recall that the estimated capital project cost of the major items announced by my predecessor last year was $140m. And let me add immediately that these figures do not include the ultimate cost of the facilities that may be developed at Cockburn Sound — merely the estimated cost of the first stage, the Causeway — or the full cost of designing the light destroyer, let alone any element of cost for the destroyers that may ultimately be ordered.
I wish to indicate on a functional basis the importance of these decisions. Our maritime capability will be enhanced by the two additional Oberon class submarines and by the new naval communications station at Darwin. Our aim in pressing forward with the design studies for the new class of light destroyers, announced by my predecessor, is also to add to our maritime capability.
Strategic mobility will be improved by the construction of a logistic cargo ship. This will be capable of carrying the Army's landing craft, vehicles, equipment and stores to areas of operation and of unloading them without recourse to developed ports. While this ship will be designed to serve the Army's needs, it will, when not required for defence purposes, be available for efficient commercial operation by the Australian National Line. It should be noted that the decision made last year to construct fast combat support ship in Australia at a cost of $42m was also directly related to the improvement of our strategic mobility.
Our tactical mobility, and at the same time fire power and battle-field surveillance of our forces, will be improved by the acquisition of 11 helicopter gunships and we will also buy 42 utility helicopters and 84 light helicopters which will provide for replacement of the existing equipment over its period of service and also add to the eventual strength. The final decision about the type of gunship should be made in April. The choice remains between the Huey Cobra and the armed Iroquois. There are two possibilities for the light observation helicopter. They are the Bell OH 58A and the Westland Sud SA341. There are no technical considerations which would bias the decision for their required military purposes. The final selection will be made on the basis of the best prospects for local manufacture, including commercial sales. It will be recalled that last year we decided to buy 12 medium lift helicopters and 8 heavy landing craft, directed to the same end — the improvement of our tactical mobility.
Our offensive capability will be improved not only by the purchase of the 2 Oberon submarines which I have mentioned but also by the doubling of the Skyhawk strength of the RAN to 20 aircraft. This latter purchase is subject to the proviso that we can get early deliveries and therefore a high utilisation during the remaining; life of HMAS 'Melbourne'. I might add, Mr Speaker, that there is every indication that early delivery will be accomplished.
To improve the general capability of the Army, Cabinet last year gave the Army permission to enter into commitments for capital equipment which would bring expenditure up to a level of $60m for the year 1970-71. Cabinet has now approved the Army entering into additional commitments up to the same level for the year 1971-72.1 These authorisations will enable the Army to take full advantage of forward ordering for long lead items. A great deal of Army equipment concerns very important but unspectacular items. In addition to the equipments I have specially mentioned, items now to be procured include additional armoured personnel carriers, trucks cargo ¾-ton and other load carrying vehicles, lightweight manpack radio sets and other communications equipment, engineering equipment, large quantities of ammunition of various calibres, tentage and shelters. These new authorisations will also enable more and better equipment to be made available to the Citizen Military Forces, which I regard as a matter of great importance. Procurement of new equipment planned to satisfy CMF needs includes increasingly items of operational standard such as personnel carriers of the type in use in Vietnam and manpack radio sets.
The Government is also well aware that there are other requirements that must be met in future but on which decisions are not yet possible — in some cases because testing and evaluation have not yet proceeded far enough, in some cases because further research and development are necessary, in others because our studies are not far enough advanced. Vehicles, tanks, surface to air missiles for the Army are illustrations; maritime reconnaissance and strategic airlift aircraft for the RAAF are others. Further ahead are problems associated with the replacement of the Mirages.
As we enter a new decade I believe it would be instructive to glance backward for a moment and see how far we have come since 1960. While I do not wish to weary the House with a detailed comparison of our forces today with those of 10 years ago, may I illustrate our progress including the impact of present decisions, again in functional terms.
Our maritime capability has been built up by the addition of 3 guided missile destroyers, all of which have performed intensive service in Vietnam; 4 Oberon class submarines, thus restoring this versatile weapon system to an important place in the structure of the RAN; a major modernisation of HMAS 'Melbourne’ and its re-equipment with Tracker, Skyhawk and Wessex aircraft, the re-equipment of an RAAF Neptune squadron with Orion aircraft; 20 patrol boats essential for surveillance and control of coastal waters both of Australia and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea; and the replacement of 'Q' class and Tribal class frigates with 6 River class destroyer escorts, the last of which will commission later this year. As well, our oceanographic and hydrographic capability, so necessary to successful maritime operations, is being developed with modern survey and hydrographic ships and an oceanographic research ship. The new Oberons and later the light destroyers will add further to maritime capability.
Our strategic mobility has been enhanced by the conversion of the former carrier HMAS 'Sydney’ to a fast troop transport; the acquisition of a second squadron of Hercules transport aircraft; the addition of a fast fleet tanker, HMAS 'Supply’, and the Australian built destroyer maintenance ship, HMAS 'Stalwart’; and now the construction of a fast combat support ship approved last August; and the Army logistic ship, announced tonight.
Great strides have been made in tactical mobility. In I960 the Army was still operating much as it had in World War II. Now it is aided by 2 squadrons of Caribou short take off and landing aircraft, numbers of utility and light helicopters, a whole new range of armoured personnel carriers and related vehicles, and water craft of various kinds. The Army Aviation Corps has been established and is progressively expanding. Further purchases announced last year include medium lift helicopters and 8 landing craft heavy. The choice for the medium lift helicopter remains between the Boeing Vertol and Sikorsky. Tonight’s announcement of additional observation helicopters, of 42 utility helicopters and of 11 helicopter gunships adds greatly to this capacity.
While there has been increase in our offensive capabilities, there are, as the House, Mr Speaker, will be aware, yet unresolved problems concerning the strike aircraft. New equipment in service or on order includes 4 squadrons of Mirage aircraft, which are also effective in the ground support role, the Oberon class submarines which I have already mentioned, the Skyhawk aircraft embarked on HMAS 'Melbourne’, and the fire support capabilities of the guided missile destroyers. Tonight’s announcement of the decision to procure 2 more Oberons and 10 additional Skyhawks provides significant additions.
Over the decade our general Army capability has been vastly improved, both by the introduction of national service and by(he procurement of large quantities of modern and effective equipment. Today we have nine battle proved battalions and, in addition, three squadrons of highly trained SAS. Over the last 10 years the Army has in large measure been re-equipped. More modern howitzers, anti-tank weapons, mortars, machine guns and rifles and radio sets have been purchased in large numbers. Stocks of light, medium and heavy trucks have been greatly improved. The 2½-ton and 5-ton trucks have been designed and .constructed in Australia and contracts have been let for the prototype of a 1-ton general purpose vehicle which will replace the ¾-ton truck over a period of years. More modern water transport vehicles and additional landing craft of various sizes have been obtained. One effect of the purchases made in recent years is to increase the range of modern weapons and equipment available to the CMF both during home training and particularly whilst in camp.
Manpower
The manpower of the regular forces has been built up considerably over the last 10 years from 48,000 in January 1960 to 84,700 in January 1970. Of this total the Navy strength has grown from 10,600 to 17,400; the Army from 21,900 to 44,500 and the Royal Australian Air Force from 15,500 to 22,800. In the same 10-year period the Pacific Islands Regiment has increased from 600 to 2,500.
Infrastructure
Much has been done to build up the infrastructure upon which the efficiency of our Services depends. The last decade has seen the greatest building programme for the Services in Australian history. Extensive army establishments have been built at Swanbourne, Western Australia; Puckapunyal, Victoria; Holsworthy, Kapooka and Singleton in New South Wales; Enoggera and Townsville in Queensland; while barracks for the Pacific Islands Regiment have been completed at Port Moresby, Lae, Wewak and Goldie River.
For the Navy, major refitting facilities for submarines, barracks, ammunition depot extensions and patrol craft facilities have been built in the Sydney area. Very large improvements have been carried out at the training centres at HMAS 'Leeuwin' at Fremantle; HMAS 'Cerberus’ at Flinders and HMAS 'Nirimba’ at Schofields. Improvements have also been carried out to the dockyards at Garden Island, Cockatoo Island and Williamstown.
Many millions of dollars also have been spent on the rehabilitation and development of Royal Australian Air Force bases throughout Australia. The modernization and improvement to Department of Supply factories has continued. A new plant for the production of TNT is nearing completion at the Albion explosives factory.
New works under construction or approved include the development of the RAAF airfield at Learmonth, the construction of the access causeway at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia, the establishment of the Army Aviation Centre at Oakey in Queensland, erection of a new clothing factory at Coburg in Victoria and construction of storage facilities for the Department of Supply at St Marys, New South Wales. Also in hand is the provision of personnel accommodation for the Royal Australian Navy at Nowra, whilst new Citizen Military Forces depots are programmed for Blacktown and Armidale in New South Wales, and Sunshine, Clayton and Oakleigh in Victoria. Other major works proposals are under consideration.
Over the past 10 years, the Government has spent $413m on capital works and real estate procurement programmes for the Services and the Department of Supply and $56m on the provision of houses for servicemen under the Commonwealth/States Housing Agreement. In the current financial year additional amounts of $49m and $10mrespectively will be spent.
The Citizen Forces
No statement of the character I am making would be complete without mention of our citizen forces. There has, I believe, been a tendency in recent years for the public to overlook the vital importance of the citizen forces to Australia's defence capacity and posture. In the case of the Citizen Military Force, factors tending to influence this have been the growth of the Regular Army, the introduction and development of the national service scheme, our involvement in the Vietnam war, and the publicity which all of them have had.
Many people have come to think of the Regular Army supplemented by the national service scheme being all that we need for the Army to be able satisfactorily to fulfil its role. The success of our Army component in its role in Vietnam may itself engender such notions. This must be corrected. We must plan for many contingencies. Some require forces in excess of the sort of Regular Army we can foresee as being reasonably within our capacity as a nation to man, equip and maintain in peace. If our planning is to have credibility and substance, it must be backed up by realistic and practicable methods of providing follow-up forces for the Regular Army.
So, in general, the role of the CMF is twofold —
(1) to provide back up forces for The Regular Army in times of defence emergency;
(2) to provide for expansion in the event of mobilisation if that should ever again be upon us.
In spite of the operational requirements of the Regular Army the overall equipment position for the CMF is as good as, if not better than, it has ever been before. There are, however, some recognised deficiencies, particularly in Armour and Signals, which will be overcome.
Good progress has been made in the provision of new training depots and the replacement of old style or temporary buildings for the Citizen Military Forces in all commands, and significant provision is being made in this field for the future. The new type depots are designed according to the functional needs of units under modem conditions of training. It is in the field of training that the greatest advances have been made. Far greater emphasis is now placed upon centralised rather than unit training for the production and subsequent promotion of officers, the training of noncommissioned officers and specialists, and the basic training of recruits.
The present size and structure of the CMF provides a sound basis for future planning. Such matters as organisation, equipment and training will be examined along with similar features of the regular forces — for the regular and CMF components cannot be considered in isolation.
If I had in my remarks devoted major attention to the CMF I would not like it thought that I am unmindful of the needs of the Naval Reserve and Citizen Air Force units. These also are being given attention.
Conclusion
I believe it is important that the House should know, that the Australian people should know, as much as can be, of what we are doing in the defence field.
Mr Bryant — It is too long.
Mr MALCOLM FRASER — If this Statement is too long, the honourable member will know the reason for it. I have tried to depict the total picture but necessarily many of the matters have been mentioned only in the briefest terms. While I have mentioned in the broadest possible terms the kinds of roles our forces have to fulfil, and the functional areas calling for particular attention, the level of forces necessary for these tasks and the equipment provided for them have to be decided by the Government after weighing all considerations. The Services requirements are first subjected to the kind of examination I have outlined. But when these requirements have been reviewed, it falls to the Government of the day to decide the resources that can be devoted to defence. There are in our sort of society 'constraints’ on what can be done in any area. We have learned long ago that defence needs cannot be divorced from other community needs. No country can meet every possible defence contingency. So it falls to the Government, having weighed the best advice it can get from its military and civilian advisers, to judge the likely threats and the likely tasks that will fall to our forces at any one time. The Government has to judge what must be done to enable them to be discharged, and weigh the cost against the other demands that our community makes upon resources.
There is no scope for complacency about what we must do to ensure the future security of Australia. I have indicated that in the circumstances of the British withdrawal from our North, and of American re-appraisal, Australia will be required to put forth a greater effort embodying greater. independence. I envisage the capability of our forces being continuously improved in the years ahead. I do not suggest that we can afford to devote resources to defence, unmindful of Australia's needs in other areas. We must hope to establish circumstances by diplomacy, by policies of economic assistance, by policies of regionaI security, in which the countries of our region will be able to devote their full resources to improving the standard of life of their own people.
While this must be and will remain our objective we will be naive to think that less will be required of us in the future. Any assessment of our circumstances points to the need for a greater effort. The shape and the structure of our forces at the present time have served Australia well. For the future they will provide a basis on which further development can take place. Mr Speaker, I present the following paper:
Defence — Ministerial Statement, 10 March 1970.
Motion (by Mr Snedden) proposed: That the House take note of the paper.
Debate (on motion by Mr Barnard) adjourned.